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Remarks:

Per our conversation.

Executive Secretary

23 Feb 82

Date

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State Dept. review completed

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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TO:

OVP - Ms. Nancy Bearg Dyke (ES 8204513)
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SUBJECT: Libya: Public Affairs Strategy

At the last Libya Task Force meeting several agency representatives expressed interest in better developed material on the public presentation of our Libya policy. As background for preparing such a public affairs strategy paper we are attaching an updated version of the December paper on this subject and a copy of testimony that was prepared for hearings last December that never were held.

We would appreciate agency comments or suggestions on these papers by ~~COB Tuesday, February 23~~, so we can refine our public affairs strategy on Libya. Comments should be sent to Elaine Morton of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (632-0993 - Room 7419).

at the 24 Feb meeting
(NIO/NEA will arrange)
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:


1. Paper on Public Affairs Strategy
2. Testimony


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A PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA

An effective public affairs strategy for gaining support for whatever measures we decide to take against Qadhafi would have to (1) dramatize the message of the danger we feel Libya poses to U.S. interests and to international order; (2) anticipate fears and opposition likely to be engendered by the specific policy actions chosen to deal with Qadhafi; (3) counter these concerns with arguments designed to alleviate undue anxiety and appeal to overriding motives of morality and patriotism; and (4) expend the necessary resources and utilize sufficiently varied channels to get the message across to broad and opinion-shaping sectors of the public.

Danger Posed by Qadhafi.

We would want to get the following message across:

-- The political ideology subscribed to by Qadhafi is antithetical to U.S. and western interests and to the norms of international order subscribed to by most civilized nations.

(1) Qadhafi considers assassination and terrorism to be legitimate vehicles for accomplishing his policy objectives.

- He has supported regimes as reprehensible as that of Idi Amin.

- He operates a network of terrorist training camps in Libya; people trained in these camps are then fanned out within Africa, throughout Europe, and as far away globally as the Philippines. (Declassify this information, as necessary.)

- Groups supported include the Red Brigades (who took credit for the killing of Aldo Moro and the kidnapping of General Dozier in Italy).

- Qadhafi planned to assassinate U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Eilts in 1977 and was deterred from attempting to do so only by strong action on our part. Within the last three months, Qadhafi's supporters have publicly threatened the life of President Reagan and have sent assassination teams to target several U.S. Ambassadors in Western Europe.

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(2) Qadhafi's incursion into Chad, ostensibly to support the legitimate government there in the midst of an ongoing civil war, was followed by demands that Chad merge with Libya. When these demands were rejected and Qadhafi was asked to leave in favor of an OAU-sponsored peacekeeping force, Qadhafi tried to manipulate the situation by withdrawing precipitately, taking food and supplies with him, and depositing new armaments with pro-Libyan guerrilla forces so that they could carry on their campaign against the central government on Libya's behalf. Libya is reported to hope either that the resulting chaos in Chad will result in an invitation to the Libyans to return or that the ascendancy of pro-Libyan forces who will view the merger plan with greater favor than their predecessors will be achieved on the battlefield. These goals could be advanced by a recent OAU plan calling for elections in Chad and departure of the Peacekeeping Force in June, just before Libya is scheduled to become OAU Chairman. (Declassify this information, as necessary.)

(3) Qadhafi's opposition to Israel and the Camp David process is well-known. In efforts to undermine constructive approaches to Middle East peace, Qadhafi has supported the most radical of the Palestine liberation groups -- those openly subscribing to the the use of terrorism -- to achieve their goals.

(4) Partly as a result of his regional ambitions to head a pan-Saharan Islamic State and partly in opposition to the U.S. and Camp David, Qadhafi has supported dissident groups in pro-Western Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, the Sudan, and Egypt -- along with a score of smaller African countries.

- Qadhafi's gloating in the wake of the assassination of Anwar Sadat and his exhortations aimed at achieving the overthrow of the successor regime in Egypt were particularly obnoxious -- and give a measure of the man he is.

(5) Within Libya, itself, Qadhafi is punishing opponents to his regime with arrest and torture, while subscribing to an anarchistic philosophy that alleges that there is no government. Instead, there are "People's Committees" that undertake actions in the name of the

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people in a manner that leaves the individual citizen of Libya no redress against their excesses.

- Libyans who oppose the regime are not safe even when living in exile abroad. Qadhafi has called for their liquidation as enemies of the Libyan revolution.

- Qadhafi's long reach in this regard has extended to western European countries and even to the United States, as illustrated by the widely publicized shooting incident involving a Libyan dissent graduate student living in Colorado.

-- Qadhafi and the power that he could command by virtue of Libya's small population of 3 million would pose a relatively small threat were it not for Libya's huge oil income. Under normal oil market conditions, this income amounts to \$25 billion a year. Before the discovery of oil, Libya was one of the world's poorest countries.

-- Libya has used its oil income not to help in the economic development of other poor countries, but to purchase a vast arsenal of advanced Soviet weaponry, far in excess of its own legitimate defense needs.

- Libya has already purchased over \$12 billion worth of Soviet weapons, paying the Soviets, in turn, much-needed hard cash.

- These weapons, in addition to Libyan campaigns of subversion directed against its neighbors, pose a substantial regional threat in North Africa and in the Horn of Africa -- areas crucial to the protection of the Mediterranean and the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

- We cannot be certain of Soviet motives in providing a client as reckless as Qadhafi with such advanced arms, but cannot discount the possibility that the Soviets have pre-positioned advanced weaponry in Libya to serve their own military purposes some time in the future.

-- Libya has widely proclaimed its intention to produce an Islamic nuclear bomb. In spite of our efforts to curtail the dissemination of nuclear technology and weapons-usable materials, Libya's oil income makes it almost impossible to prevent black market acquisition of proscribed items.

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U.S. Response to this Danger.

We have already taken several steps designed to demonstrate that we will not conduct business as usual with a regime led by a person we consider to be an international outlaw. The most dramatic of these steps were the closing of the Libyan People's Bureau in the U.S. in May 1981, the U.S. naval exercise in international waters illegally claimed by Libya in August 1981 and the President's December 1981 call for the voluntary departure of U.S. citizens from Libya. All but about 400 Americans have now left Libya and those remaining understand they are doing so at their own risk. In addition, we have taken a variety of steps designed to curtail Libya's ability to support international subversion and to reduce Libya's conventional military capabilities.

If we decide to move further and undertake economic actions like (1) a unilateral boycott of U.S. imports of oil from Libya; (2) a broadened ban on exports to Libya, we can expect the following concerns to be expressed by the U.S. public:

-- First, fear that the U.S. will pay for these actions at the marketplace. In particular, there is likely to be an expectation that denial of Libyan oil -- whether by our own action or by Libyan reprisal -- will cause U.S. domestic consumers hardship. Memories of the long gas lines of 1973 are still sharp, as is concern about the high cost of home heating fuel and its impact on the poor and elderly.

-- Second, antagonism generated by the assumption that others will profit commercially at U.S. expense. This will be especially acute if wide publicity is given to the likely continuation of lucrative business relationships between Libya and our western allies.

In order to counteract these concerns, we would want to stress the moral issue: service of the national interest rather than private gain. Our policies would be making it clear that we were not going to be doing "business as usual" with an international outlaw. No longer would U.S. dollars be used to fund international terrorism and purchase advanced Soviet weapons.

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We would also want to undertake a campaign to explain those aspects of the oil market that are especially relevant here:

-- In the current period of glut, the U.S. is only importing 3 percent of its imported oil supplies from Libya.

-- Oil of equal quality and lower prices is available elsewhere, especially in Nigeria.

-- Even if the current glut should disappear, the U.S. would be able to replace Libyan oil with that of other suppliers.

-- Our recent policies to move forward on conservation measures, the filling of our Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and the encouragement of exploration for new sources of oil through de-control of oil prices, are all measures that help provide us with a safety net in the event that supplies are discontinued from a single source.

-- Even though we have deplored the use of oil as a weapon, there is no guarantee that oil producing nations will not again seek to embargo oil to the West. By our actions we will have indicated that consuming nations have a card to play, too, and that we will no longer follow passive and reactive policies that leave the initiative with the Libyas of this world. (Although this theme would resonate well with an American audience, we may want to forego its use because, when replayed in Arab oil-producing states, it may: engender sympathy for Qadhafi; reactivate sensitivity about the possibility of the formation of a "consumer cartel;" and, in a worse-case scenario, impel consideration of a counter-boycott against the U.S.)

Channels for an Information Campaign

These would be varied. In addition to backgrounders to the press, we would want to ask key administration officials -- from the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, and Defense -- to brief opinion-shaping groups privately and to give public addresses in the forums that would gain the greatest publicity: the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the World Affairs Council, the Foreign Policy Association, and other similar groups -- with special emphasis on regional dispersal.

We would also want to mount a speaking campaign, coordinated by State, to reach public affairs groups at the community level. The scope of this effort and the resources

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we would devote to it would depend, in part, on the measures chosen to deal with Libya. Similarly dependent on the kind of measures chosen would be the kind of audience targeted at the community level.

Timing

The sequencing of the components of a public affairs campaign, and the amount of lead-time needed for each one would also be partially dependent on the measures chosen and the need for secrecy prior to their effective enactment. We could certainly begin with a campaign to outline the general threat Qadhafi presents, as indicated in the first section of this paper. Following this, we would want to tailor the subsequent stages of the information campaign to the requirements set by the measures chosen and others that we see downstream.

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I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee on a subject of great concern to this government: the behavior of the Government of Libya. We believe that the policies of the Qadhafi regime are threatening to the world order, as well as to the interests of the United States and our friends and allies. We have said so on several occasions since the very beginning of this Administration, and we have taken steps to indicate the depth and intensity of our concern. We are concerned about many aspects of Libyan activities, ranging from the invasion and occupation of Chad, systematic attempts to destabilize Africa and the Middle East, active support of terror, the acquisition of enormous quantities of Soviet weapons, and brutal repression within Libya itself. Due to time constraints, I shall limit myself to only two of these subjects here today: Libyan involvement in international terrorism, and the recent Tripartite Pact between Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen.

Terrorism

Qadhafi has repeatedly used armed aggression against other African countries, and actively supported terrorism directed against targets throughout the world. Qadhafi has

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authorized terrorist attacks against high-ranking American officials in the past. The threat may well exist at this moment.

Ambassador Maxwell Rabb, for example, became the target of Libyan assassination squads in Rome. He was apparently selected both because he is Jewish and because he has been a highly effective representative of the United States in Italy. His close friendship with the President evidently made Ambassador Rabb a tempting target for a Libyan regime eager to avenge itself following its loss of two aircraft in an attack against American planes in the Bay of Sidra.

But Ambassador Rabb is not the only American Ambassador targeted by Libya; others have had to become similarly concerned about their personal safety.

While the targets may be new, the technique is not, for Qadhafi has been a major paymaster of assassins for many years. We have seen Libyan-supported terrorism from the Philippines to the Middle East, and the Libyan apparatus for training and supplying terrorists is impressive indeed. We have identified at least 17 camps inside Libya where terrorists are trained. We believe that there have been about 5,000 persons who have received terrorist training in Libya in the past year or so, and about three times that number have "graduated" from the camps over the course of the past decade. In the past few years, the Camps have been

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substantially upgraded, and are now equipped with high-level instructors and training equipment that permits trainees to become skilled in paramilitary techniques including underwater demolition methods, sabotage, hand-to-hand combat and assassination. We also believe that instructors in these camps include persons from Cuba and from the Soviet Bloc, along with veterans of the international terrorist network such as the Venezuelan known as Carlos the Jackal.

We believe that Libya has long maintained links to major terrorist organizations in Western Europe, including the German Baader-Meinhof group, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Irish Republican Army. We find it suggestive that one of the accused murderers of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro was arrested in Italy after returning there from Libya.

Since March of 1980, Libyan operatives have assassinated at least a dozen of their own nationals abroad. The major liquidation campaign took place between March and June of last year, when Qadhafi ordered a temporary halt to the executions. But there was another shooting in October, and the following month one student was killed and two children poisoned with some peanuts evidently intended for their father. We believe that all these actions were carried out either by Libyan nationals or by persons working closely with representatives of the Libyan Government. Moreover, Libyan diplomatic missions have been deeply involved in channeling support for terrorist operations.

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Qadhafi's relentless efforts to destabilize African countries that do not share his messianic objectives have often led to humiliating exposures. For example, last year nearly 30 citizens of Senegal took refuge in their Embassy in Tripoli after they had been lured to Libya by offers of good employment. But once in Libya, instead of settling in to work they were shipped off to a military training camp, where they were scheduled to be trained as guerrilla fighters for the Sahel Liberation Army. After the unfortunate Senegalese escaped from the training camp and found sanctuary in the Senegalese Embassy, the two countries broke diplomatic relations. The man who recruited these Senegalese citizens, an Islamic fundamentalist by the name of Ahmed Niasse, was later arrested in Niger, where he awaits trial for activities against that country's government.

At the moment, Qadhafi is training terrorists for use against several African countries. One example will suffice for the moment: Libya is planning to use hundreds of commandos of the Eagle Brigade from the so-called "Sons of Ali" against Oman. The commandos are working with the Front for the Liberation of Oman, based in South Yemen.

This is not an extraordinary example, and many African countries are now threatened by Libyan subversion. The nation of Chad was recently invaded and occupied by Libyan armed forces (aided by East German and Soviet advisers), and in

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years past Libya has supported the likes of Idi Amin Dada of Uganda.

The Aden Pact

The dimension of Qadhafi's goals can be better appreciated by a recent diplomatic move. This past August the leaders of Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen signed a tripartite agreement -- known as the Aden Pact -- that is ostensibly a treaty of friendly economic and military cooperation among regional states. Yet this peculiar alliance between three widely scattered countries appears to be an active effort to expand Qadhafi's influence in Africa in both the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn. The alliance is peculiar, for despite Qadhafi's much-vaunted claim to be the charismatic leader of an Islamic movement, his allies in this case are both outspoken Marxists, with close ties to the Soviet Union. Moreover, despite Qadhafi's lip-service to the principle of national integrity, there are secret military clauses to the Aden Pact that provide for the deployment of armed forces from each of the signatories to the territory of the others. We believe that there are now discussions under way between Qadhafi and Mengistu aimed at bringing Ethiopian armed forces into Libya in the near future.

It may be argued that Qadhafi is so insecure in his own country that he feels he needs foreign troops to protect him

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at home, and certainly Qadhafi's record of capricious and economically ruinous behavior is producing considerable domestic antagonism to his regime. But we are also concerned that such troops might be used to fulfill Qadhafi's documented dreams of foreign adventures. After all, Libya is a country with but three million people, and the availability of Ethiopian troops -- in tandem with the vast quantities of Soviet military materiel in place in Libya -- would greatly increase Qadhafi's military power.

These fears acquire greater substance when viewed against the backdrop of recent statements and actions by the Libyan dictator. We believe that Qadhafi intends to use the Aden Pact as a means of overthrowing the pro-Western governments of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Chad and Somalia, as well as that of North Yemen. He has accused the first four countries of becoming "U.S. bases," and has publicly threatened to have their leaders assassinated. Moreover, Qadhafi has urged Mengistu to comply with Libyan plans to subvert the government of Sudan and to remove President Nimeiri. To this end, Qadhafi transferred some 150 million dollars to Ethiopia's account in October -- a meaningful move, since Libya has recently encountered some cash flow problems for the first time in many years.

The Aden Pact is also being used against Somalia. Libyan-Ethiopian cooperation has led to increased economic and training assistance to guerrillas in the so-called Somali Salvation Front, aimed against the regime of Siad Barre.

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Finally, the Aden Pact moves Qadhafi closer to one of the world's vital strategic choke points: the Bab el Mandab outlet from the Red Sea.

As if this were not enough, we also have reason to believe that the Soviet Union played a behind-the-scenes role in the creation of the Pact. This is of a piece with the overall picture of Libya's relations with the Soviet Union, for while Qadhafi claims to represent an Islamic faith that has little if anything in common with Communism, Qadhafi's international behavior is frequently highly useful to Soviet interests. As I have suggested, this is evident, for example, in the case of terror.

American Policy

What has the United States done in the face of such behavior? In the first place, we have moved to assist those countries most directly threatened by Libyan threats. These are most notably Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Niger, Somalia and Morocco. Help has ranged from confidence-building measures such as demonstrations of American defensive capabilities (including the prompt dispatch of AWACs to Egypt and the Bright Star exercise), to expediting and increasing FMS credits and economic aid. We have recently supported the creation of a peace-keeping force in Chad, under the leadership of the Organization for African Unity. We are currently providing the peace-keeping force with logistical and financial support.

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Moreover, at an early date in this Administration we asked the official representatives of Libya in this country to return home, and we have also indicated that we will not accept outrageous Libyan territorial claims, whether on land or sea. We have demonstrated our capacity to counter at least some of those claims, in particular in the Bay of Sidra.

We have, then, long been concerned about Libya, and we welcomed the Percy Amendment encouraging us to maintain a constant high-level review of our policies toward Libya. Like this Subcommittee, we have recognized that it might be necessary to make some changes, and we are encouraged by your bipartisan support. As you know, the President will shortly make a statement on this subject, and it would be improper for me to anticipate his words. However, with your permission, Madame Chairwoman, I would like to give you some general thoughts about the problems we may all face in this area.

American Citizens in Libya

We have been concerned about the safety of American citizens in Libya since our Embassy was closed in 1980. The evidence we have of Qadhafi's hostile intent toward American officials has led us to the conclusion that the safety of these citizens is now increasingly threatened, and we as a government have no means in Tripoli to provide for their protection. Consequently, the President is meeting today with officials of many of the companies with operations in Libya.

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He will be talking with them about our concerns for the safety of their employees.

Oil

Colonel Qadhafi has been able to acquire considerable power on the international scene because of the revenues he realizes from the sale of Libyan oil. Without this money he would not have been able to acquire such great quantities of Soviet arms, and would not have been able to make such a contribution to the proliferation of terrorism throughout the world. Yet it is difficult for the United States to deal effectively with the source of Libyan wealth.

Strong measures inevitably cut in many directions. The community of nations has become so intensely intertwined that it is difficult to affect any one element without touching many others at the same time. Our relations with Libya, minimal though they are, nonetheless involve many other countries, some of which are close friends and allies of the United States. This is particularly important in the area of economic relations. It is safe to say that any serious economic measure taken by the United States Government to indicate its displeasure with Qadhafi's actions, would automatically have some deleterious effect on at least some of our allies and friends.

Moreover, in many cases currently under review, we find that serious measures against Libya would adversely affect some of our own corporations, and might also damage the reputa-

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tion for reliability that the United States has acquired over the years.

I raise these points, Madame Chairwoman, not to endorse a policy of inaction or of business as usual, but simply to call this Subcommittee's attention to the concerns with which we have had to deal in reviewing our policy toward Libya. The arguments in favor of taking strong action are compelling: one does not conduct business as usual with a country whose policies involve the use of terror. One does not conduct business as usual with a country that repeatedly uses armed aggression and murder as basic ingredients of its foreign policy. And one does not conduct business as usual with a country that relentlessly attacks American friends and interests throughout the Middle East, and as far away as the Philippines.

The evidence I have recounted of Libyan behavior and of our response to it may lead to the impression that we are embarked on some kind of anti-Libyan campaign. This is not the case. We have made clear to Libyans at all levels over the last two years, since they destroyed our Embassy in Tripoli in December, 1979, that we are prepared to return to normal relationships just as soon as the outrageous behavior of Libyan officials under Qadhafi's leadership stops.

In planning for the future, we have sought to define courses of action that would both demonstrate our dismay at Libyan policies, and produce a palpable effect on Qadhafi's

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behavior. While we rule out no option in advance, we have no desire to use force, even in the face of the threat of force from the dictator of Libya. But Qadhafi should realize that we have no intention of acquiescing in lawless behavior.

I am grateful to this Subcommittee for giving me the chance to outline our concerns regarding the government of Libya. I will be delighted to answer your questions, today or later on.

Thank you.

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